Research Projects
I am currently working on three research projects. My major project investigates the concept of solidarity. Specifically, I develop a puzzle about how different forms of solidarity are related to one another and defend a novel theory that can explain the structure of these related forms. One significant upshot of my research is that solidarity is not a peripheral political concept, it is as important as equality and liberty. I say more about this project under "works in progress".
The second project aims to flesh out the ethical implications of Donald Davidson's late systematic thought that focused on objectivity in both theoretical and practical philosophy. This system depends on a metaphysical argument, called the triangulation argument, about the possibility of objective thought. The main aim is to develop a form of moral particularism based on the commitments of the Davidsonian system.
Finally, I am drawing out some of the ethical implications of my work on joint action. In particular, there is a kind of agential harm that occurs when agents fail to act together, and I argue that this is best characterised as a form of alienation.
Publications
(2023) “Joint Action and Spontaneity”. European Journal of Philosophy, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12926
(2022) "A Davidsonian Account of the Practicality of Practical Reasoning" Res Philosophica 99 (1): 67-89.
Works in Progress
Books
The Ties that Bind: Solidarity and Equality (Proposal under review)
The manuscript develops a theory of solidarity in response to an unrecognised problem in the solidarity literature: how are forms of solidarity related to one another and, so, count as forms of the same phenomenon? The root of the problem is that solidarity seems to give some groups of people authority over others. I defend a novel theory that solidarity is a structured joint action done for the sake of political equality. I further argue that just as equality helps illuminate solidarity, solidarity helps to illuminate equality.
Articles
Paper under review
The paper argues that to inquiry into solidarity ought to take a social ontological approach, otherwise it will miss important features of solidarity. To show the importance of the approach, the paper shows how psychological theories of solidarity fail to explain its distinctive social bond.
“The Publicity of Reasons”
The paper provides a novel argument, based on Donald Davidson’s triangulation argument, for the thesis that normative reasons are public. This argument, unlike Korsgaard’s, takes full advantage of the social basis of thought, language, and reason.
“Spontaneity and Normative Reasons for Joint Action”
The paper argues that normative reasons for joint action must be construed according to realism about reasons so long as spontaneity is a requirement on joint action.
Dissertation Abstract
The dissertation defends a novel account of joint agency, one that accommodates the neglected phenomenon of spontaneous joint action. The goals of the dissertation are to reveal the importance of spontaneous joint action, to show why these actions are problematic for many accounts of joint agency, and to produce a satisfactory theory of them. Chapter 1 argues that being capable of explaining spontaneous joint actions is in fact a requirement on a satisfactory theory of joint agency and this poses a challenge to meeting the other requirement on such a theory, the togetherness requirement. Spontaneous joint actions are those performed by co-agents who have not interacted in ways that bind them together. The challenge, then, is to adequately explain how co-agents are joined together without binding interaction. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and argues that extant theories do not meet the challenge of spontaneity because they cannot satisfy both requirements together. Chapter 3 develops the reasons account of joint action, which appeals to normative group reasons, in order to meet the challenge. Grasping a group reason forces agents to occupy the co-agential point of view because the group reason indicates who is to act and what they ought to do together. If two agents grasp their group reason, they are already bound together such that were they to act on the reason, they would act together spontaneously. Chapter 4 investigates which theory of normative reasons is consistent with spontaneity. Both motivating reasons and internalism about normative reasons are found lacking. Instead, it is argued that realism about normative reasons provides the best account of normative group reasons because the objective nature of real reasons eliminates the need for binding interaction, and it can more easily accommodate the inherent publicity of group reasons. Finally, Chapter 5 argues for realism about normative reasons, the existence of group reasons, and the unrestricted publicity of normative reasons. It does this by showing how these are all consequences of Davidson’s triangulation argument.
(This is one of my cats, Ziggy.)